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The PRS Approach and the Paris Agenda: 
Experiences in Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
Abstract 
 
The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness stipulates that broadly owned and results 
oriented national plans will be the basis for establishing national ownership and 
leadership of the aid process and for improving alignment and harmonization. In this 
sense, there is a close link between the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach and the 
Paris Agenda, both of which form part of the new aid paradigm that started around the 
year 2000.  
 
This paper assesses the actual progress in the implementation of the new aid paradigm 
in three Latin American countries: Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. The results are 
disappointing. Frequent government changes and the composition of the donor group in 
the countries are partially responsible for the disappointing results, but the main 
conclusion is that the new aid paradigm is based on unrealistic expectations about the 
role that national poverty reduction or development plans can play in promoting the 
principles of the Paris Agenda.  
 
Keywords: PRSP; Paris Declaration; aid effectiveness; donor harmonization; Bolivia; 
Honduras; Nicaragua 
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1. Introduction 
 
The introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in 1999, together with the 
definition of the eight Millennium Development Goals in 2000, can be seen as the start of a 
“new aid paradigm”, focused on achieving tangible results in poverty reduction (Renard, 
2005).  This aid paradigm calls for fundamental changes in the relationships between donors 
and aid recipients, moving towards the PRS principles of national ownership and partnership. 
Since the introduction of PRSPs, several “high level” meetings on aid effectiveness have been 
held under the auspices of the OECD (Rome 2003, Paris 2005, and Accra 2008).  In these 
meetings, donors and recipients have laid down in more detail the contours of the “new aid 
paradigm”. The 2008 “Accra Agenda for Action” basically confirmed the five commitments 
of the 2005 “Paris Declaration”, and together they can be called the “Paris Agenda”. The five 
commitments are: 
 
• Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies and strategies and coordinate development actions; 
• Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures; 
• Harmonization: Donors’ actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively 
effective; 
• Managing for results: Managing resources and improving decision-making for results; 
• Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. 
 
In fact, these five principles are in line with, and build on, the earlier five principles of the 
PRS approach: ownership, partnership, and results orientation based on long-term and 
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comprehensive poverty reduction plans. In particular, the Paris Declaration sees broadly 
owned national and sector development strategies, translated into results oriented plans, as the 
basis for achieving national ownership and leadership of the aid process, and for improving 
donor alignment and harmonization. The PRS approach envisaged that PRSPs would facilitate 
a switch from project aid to programme aid,1 and that this change in aid modality would foster 
donor coordination under government leadership. The Paris Declaration stipulates that by 
2010, 66 per cent of all aid would be given in the context of “programme based approaches”. 
Programme based approaches are meant to support national or sector development plans. The 
aid provided may be programme aid (in the form of general budget support or sector budget 
support) but also project aid if provided within sector wide approaches.2  This means that 
PRSPs, and other national or sector development plans, lie at the heart of the new consensus 
on aid effectiveness. The introduction of  PRSPs is usually seen as the beginning of the new 
aid paradigm. 
 
The question is to what extent this new aid approach can be implemented. This paper assesses 
the actual progress in the implementation in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua -- three Latin 
American countries that were required to produce and implement PRSPs in order to qualify 
for debt reduction under the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) Initiative. The results are 
disappointing, and the main question then to be answered is why this is so. Two possibilities 
emerge: the new aid paradigm was too ambitious and based on unrealistic assumptions, or the 
disappointing results are due to specific circumstances in these three countries. Two such 
specific circumstances come to mind. First, all three countries experienced frequent 
government changes, which may have hampered long-term commitments to national 
strategies, as well as stable partnership relationships with donors. Second, progress towards 
the Paris Agenda may have been hindered by the particular composition of the donor group in 
 4
these countries. Compared with other highly aid dependent countries, these countries have  a 
larger presence of donors that are less enthusiastic about the new aid paradigm, such as the 
US, Spain, Japan, and Canada. The paper concludes that, although these two factors played 
some role in hindering progress, the model itself – and particularly the idea that national plans 
can be the basis for lasting changes in donor government relations -- is also flawed in 
important respects.  
 
The next section of this paper examines the assumptions behind, and expected results of, the 
new aid paradigm and analyzes why these expected results may not always be forthcoming. 
The paper then goes on to examine the implementation of the new aid paradigm in the three 
countries, focusing on the period after 2000.  Section 3 analyzes whether the fundamentals of 
the new aid paradigm were in place: national ownership and leadership of the aid process on 
the basis of national and sector plans, and describes the extent to which aid to these countries 
was given in the context of programme based approaches. Sections 4 and 5 assess whether the 
principles of the Paris Declaration are implemented within these approaches, in particular for 
general budget support and for some examples of programme based approaches at sector 
level. The final section concludes. 
 
2. The new aid paradigm: expectations and possible contradictions 
 
The new aid paradigm is the result of two kinds of discontent with previous aid experiences. 
First, there was a lot of critique of  the policy conditionality that had accompanied structural 
adjustment loans of IMF and World Bank. The concern was that conditionality was not very 
effective: countries concede to the conditions because they badly need the aid money, but in 
practice they only implement what they intended to do anyway (Killick et al., 1999, Dollar 
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and Svensson, 2000). Second, there was a growing conviction among donors that the most 
commonly used aid modality, namely that of project aid, had also failed. Projects were often 
donor driven, and there were too many of them, each with their own procedures, reporting and 
monitoring requirements and separate implementation units. The lack of donor coordination 
led to high transaction costs for both donors and recipients. Furthermore, donors’ attempts to 
control implementation and reporting in projects undermined local capacities and reduced the 
sustainability of the projects themselves. Both concerns pointed to the importance of 
increasing domestic ownership of the activities funded through aid (by reducing donor-
imposed conditionality) and of increasing alignment with national systems and harmonization 
among donors. To achieve this, the preferred aid modality is programme aid. 
 
Although this represents the dominant perspective on the problems with aid and the need for a 
new paradigm, there is also another “narrative” behind the new aid paradigm -- one that casts 
a more negative view of the aid recipient (Renard, 2005). From this second perspective, 
project aid failed because of inadequate policies and governance in the recipient countries.  
Following this view, conditionality did not work because donors were too lenient with 
governments, which would imply that donors should  keep and even strengthen policy 
conditionality.   
 
Both perspectives on conditionality and ownership circulate in the donor community and 
sometimes even within one donor agency. This is what Rogerson (2005) calls the 
“schizophrenia” of the aid industry: conditionality is still important in aid practice, but the 
Paris Declaration is silent about it. Analyzing the Paris Declaration in more detail, it is clear 
that it contains elements of both narratives. Under “ownership”, the Paris Declaration 
stipulates that partner countries exercise leadership in the elaboration of national and sector 
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development strategies, plans which would presumably eliminate the need for donor-imposed 
policy conditions. However, the requirement to elaborate a PRSP and related sector strategies 
is itself a condition. Furthermore, one can question the extent to which real ownership, in the 
sense of control (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009), of these strategies is possible, given that they 
must be approved by the donors. A related problem is that even if governments are committed 
to implementing their poverty reduction strategies, it cannot be taken for granted that they 
have the capacity to do so. In practice, this would hinder the full alignment of aid with a 
government’s stated priorities. 
 
If donors feel that national governments lack ownership of their own plans or are unable to 
implement them, donors will not see the strategies as a credible “commitment device” – 
evidence that governments are truly committed to achieving the objectives laid out in the 
plans. Donors are not likely to provide general or sector budget support without being assured 
that certain policies will be implemented or objectives met. If they question government 
commitment to implement a plan that is consistent with the donor agenda, they will set 
additional conditions for general or sector budget support. This practice  conflicts with the 
idea of “ownership”, but also, in part, with “mutual accountability” and “partnership”. For 
example, if donors are not satisfied with government policies, they may withdraw committed 
aid money. Recipient governments do not have the same level of leverage in the relationship. 
In practice, withdrawal of committed aid reduces the predictability of aid flows -- an element 
of “mutual accountability” in the Paris Declaration. 
 
Another questionable assumption and contradiction in the new aid paradigm is that PRSPs, or 
national development strategies, are supposed to reflect a national, long-term consensus on 
the preferred development policy and on how to reduce poverty. This rational planning and 
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technocratic approach to poverty reduction not only conflicts with the political nature of 
poverty itself, but also with the political nature of policy making. It is unrealistic to expect a 
lasting consensus on the nature of the poverty problem and on how to tackle it. Policy making 
is not a rational process in which the best possible way to achieve a shared goal is defined, but 
is always a matter of compromises and incremental small steps (Van Gunsteren, 1976; 
Dijkstra, 2005). The fact that policy-making occurs incrementally also reduces the chances of 
achieving operational links between overall national strategies and actual policies. All this 
makes it difficult to use a national development or poverty reduction plan as basis for aid 
alignment and aid harmonization. 
 
There may also be other constraints to the harmonization and alignment agenda, both on the 
donor side and on the recipient side. Donors have their own priorities and accountability 
systems and often have to take the interests of their own aid business into account. Recipient 
countries are not homogeneous units either; individual ministries, staff, project leaders, 
consultants and NGOs all have reasons to favour maintaining separate donor projects.  
 
The Paris Declaration and the PRS approach largely ignore these fundamental contradictions 
and constraints. The new aid paradigm focuses on the transition to programme based 
approaches, in the hope that this change will help increase ownership, partnership, alignment 
and harmonization. According to an Appendix to the Paris Declaration, programme based 
approaches  have the following characteristics: leadership by the host country; support of a 
single comprehensive programme and budget framework; a formalized process of donor 
coordination; harmonization of donor procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial 
management, monitoring and evaluation; and, efforts to increase the use of local systems for 
 8
programme design and implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation 
(OECD, 2005).    
General budget support is, in theory, the most advanced form of aid in the sense of advancing 
ownership, alignment and harmonization. Before selecting a country for budget support, 
donors usually want certain policy and governance conditions to be fulfilled. In principle, 
after this tough “selectivity” full country ownership is possible. In practice, however, these 
entry conditions are seldom fully met, and donors then begin to use budget support to bring 
them about. Similar problems can present themselves with sector budget support. This means 
that ownership is reduced. Predictability of donor funds may also be affected if sanctions are 
applied. 
 
Potential difficulties may also arise when we consider the extent of alignment and 
harmonization of aid within programme based approaches. While general and sector budget 
support probably meet the alignment objective (using national systems), harmonization is not 
always advanced: it can be provided individually by single donor agencies, each with its own 
disbursement criteria and policy conditions. On the other hand, Sector Wide Approaches 
(SWAps) usually advance the harmonization objective because they are, by definition, an 
effort undertaken by a group of donors. However SWAps will not necessarily imply 
alignment with country systems. The latter depends on the extent to which common funds and 
projects within SWAps use government systems of planning, budgeting, administering, 
procurement, execution, and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
 
3. From PRSPs to programme based approaches in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras 
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Ownership through national plans 
 
When the first PRSPs were written in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras, the context for donor 
recipient relations was different in the three countries. Bolivia enjoyed long-term donor 
support for its stabilization and reform programme carried out since 1986. The country was a 
relative success story in donor government relations and in donor coordination.3 However, 
from 1997 onwards, governments came to power on an anti-reform agenda, basically because 
these reforms had not been able to increase the living standards of the majority of the 
population. From then on, relations between government and donors deteriorated. After 2002, 
political instability further hampered donor government relations. Like Bolivia, Nicaragua 
also has a long-term donor presence, but the relations between the government and the donors 
deteriorated under the Alemán government (1997-2001). This government was not very 
interested in cooperating with the donors, and the donors criticized the President for engaging 
in corruption. Honduras has a much shorter history of donor presence. Many bilateral donors 
only entered after hurricane Mitch struck the country in 1998. A first Consultative Group 
meeting was held in May 1999 in Stockholm, in which donors and government agreed to 
foster the reconstruction of the country, to coordinate donor efforts based on country 
priorities, and to consolidate democracy by, among other things, active participation of civil 
society (Cuesta, 2003: 94). Neither donors nor the Honduran government had much 
experience with putting these objectives into practice. 
 
Despite these different contexts, all countries suffered from high debt burdens and wanted to 
qualify for the HIPC initiative. For that reason they all elaborated and submitted their PRSPs 
in 2001. However, as shown in other articles of this issue, national ownership of the three 
original PRSPs in these countries was limited, even at the executive level of government. 
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When new governments came to the scene in all three countries in 2001 or 2002, they rejected 
the “old” strategies. In Honduras, pressure to maintain a donor-approved PRSP led to a “de 
facto” continued acceptance of the original PRSP, even after a second government change in 
2006.  The Bolaños government in Nicaragua (2002-2006) launched its own National 
Development Plan (NDP) but then made an effort to adjust it to donor wishes, finally 
resulting in an approved second PRSP in November 2005. Another government change in 
Nicaragua in January 2007 implied a new Plan and a rejection of this second PRSP. In Bolivia 
several draft PRSPs were presented between 2003 and 2005 but they were all short-lived due 
to many government changes. The Morales government (from early 2006 onward) prepared a 
new National Development Plan and showed no interest in having it approved as PRSP. High 
gas prices and support from Venezuela reduced the need to cooperate with the “traditional” 
donors. 
  
Over the years, it became clear that the existence of approved “plans” did not say much about 
national ownership of and commitment to poverty reduction policies. The first PRSPs were 
technocratic exercises written for the donors, with limited priority setting and hardly any links 
to the political priorities of the day. Implementation of these plans was largely limited to 
policies that were already under way, or policies and projects financed by the donors. Later 
plans often did represent “owned” political views, but these plans were usually not accepted 
by the donors. Donors’ reasons for rejecting the plans included insufficient participation 
(Bolivia 2003) and that poverty reduction measures and social policies were not sufficiently 
covered and that the plan was not sufficiently operational (Nicaragua 2003-2005). In 
Nicaragua, the second PRSP, finally approved by donors after changes had been made, was 
also poorly implemented: this plan was made by the Bolaños government and the Ortega 
government (in power since 2007) has other priorities. 
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 Government leadership and donor coordination in aid 
In the logic of the PRS approach, the PRSPs were intended to be an instrument for facilitating 
government leadership and donor coordination in the aid process. Government-donor working 
groups or round tables were to be mechanisms for organizing discussions with donors about 
how to support these national plans, and related sector plans, in a coordinated way. In 
practice, government leadership in coordinating aid in the three countries has varied a great 
deal, over time and across countries.  
 
In Bolivia in 2001, the government established five sector working groups (mesas de trabajo) 
for PRS execution in which international donors participated. But with the 2002 change in 
government, these working groups disappeared (Komives et al., 2003). The Mesa government 
(starting in October 2003) once again established five working groups with the participation 
of foreign donors and civil society. However, the objective was not the implementation of the 
existing PRS (which was no longer recognized as a national strategy). Rather, the five 
working groups were organized around issues of national priority: a (new) PRS; a constituent 
assembly and referendum; fiscal deficit and budget support; donor harmonization; and 
productivity and competitiveness. Progress made in the working groups depended a great deal 
on government presence and leadership, which varied from group to group. The working 
group on donor harmonization produced a Harmonization and Alignment Plan, which made 
Bolivia one of the few countries to present such a plan at the 2005 High Level meeting in 
Paris. The fiscal deficit group was also relatively successful, establishing a multi-donor 
budget support scheme in 2004 (see below) (De Jong et al., 2005). By 2005, these working 
groups were no longer functioning.  
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The Morales government made an effort to reactivate the working groups with donors in 
2006, but very few meetings were held. The (traditional) donors would have liked the 
government to present concrete sector plans to these working groups, to be used as the basis 
for project aid or sector budget support. However, the government has been able to finance its 
priorities with the aid of new donors (notably Venezuela) and some traditional donors -- 
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), European Commission (EC), and bilateral donors to 
the basic education basket) are not imposing conditions for more planning. 
 
In Honduras, the Maduro administration (2002-2006) set up sector roundtables with 
participation of government, donors and civil society in education, health, water and 
sanitation, agro-forestry, and security, with a view to start coordinating aid in these sectors. 
However, according to the donors, the roundtables did not function well. High level 
government representatives often did not attend the meetings, showing a lack of ownership 
(commitment) of the idea of programme support based on sector plans. Only in subsectors of 
health and education was an agreement achieved. In 2005, an election year, the roundtables 
grew even weaker. The Zelaya government (starting in 2006) made an effort to renew the 
sector roundtables, but there were no concrete results in the coordination of aid. Nonetheless, 
the Zelaya government was able to finance its priorities with the help of some specific donors, 
like the Solidarity Safety Net (Red Solidaria) funded by the IDB (De Jong et al., 2007).   
 
In Nicaragua, sector roundtables existed during the Bolaños government, but their level of 
performance varied. As in the other two countries, donors in Nicaragua said that performance 
depended on government leadership. It was possible to establish a sector plan for some 
sectors— education and health and, later, the rural sector (see Kay article in this issue). At 
present, the Ortega government does not appear to have much interest in reactivating these 
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roundtables. Like Bolivia, the Nicaraguan government has been able to finance its priorities, 
such as the “Zero Hunger” programme, with aid from Venezuela.  
 
The fact that, as of 2008, governments in all three countries had found donors willing to 
finance their political priorities and campaign promises shows a kind of government 
leadership over the aid process in recent years, but not in the form that the Paris Declaration 
stipulates and with hardly any donor coordination. 
 
Programme based approaches 
 
Programme aid is the most advanced form of aid within programme based approaches. Before 
2000, this non-earmarked aid was mainly provided in the form of balance of payments 
support. After 2000, budget support became the preferred form of programme aid and the 
share of programme aid was expected to increase. Contrary to expectations, available data 
suggests that the share of programme aid in total aid did not increase after 2000, and even 
appears to have decreased in Nicaragua and Honduras (Table 1). The relative stability in 
programme aid in Bolivia over time is to a large extent due to balance of payment support 
provided in 2003 and 2004 to help solve a balance of payments crisis. This was programme 
aid, but not the general budget support envisaged by the new aid paradigm, meant to sustain 
government efforts at poverty reduction. It seems that the new aid paradigm has produced 
less, rather than more, freely usable resources. 
 
Progress towards programme based approaches at sector level depends in large part on the 
work of the sector roundtables. Where these have been operating well, for example in 
Education and Health in Nicaragua, some donors have moved to sector support in the form of 
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basket funding with joint missions and evaluations. In Honduras there are a few coordinated 
efforts at sub sector level, for example in the context of the Education for All-Fast Track 
Initiative and in a programme controlling chagas, a tropical parasitic disease. In Bolivia there 
have been several baskets and joint donor efforts, for example to finance the 2001 Dialogue 
and the Ombudsman. Due to political turmoil and the change in government they were all 
paralyzed by 2006.  
 
A donor review among the more progressive donors in Bolivia concluded that pressures and 
incentives from headquarters to disburse and to write individual country strategies were too 
strong to allow for more initiatives in donor harmonization (Nordics+ donors, 2004). But the 
above analysis shows that government leadership of sector roundtables is also an important 
factor. The lack of participation, leadership, and continuity in most roundtables shows that 
sector ministries and agencies do not seem to have sufficient incentives to promote sector-
wide aid coordination. For the government, fostering donor coordination via the setting up of 
sector roundtables with donor participation may reduce government ownership and leadership 
over aid, as Whitfield (2009) concludes on the basis of a comparative study in several African 
countries. 
 
4. Budget Support and the Paris Agenda 
In theory, budget support is the aid modality most likely to achieve the principles of the Paris 
Declaration. In this section, we examine whether this assumption is true for both general and 
sector budget support. We look at the extent of harmonization and alignment within budget 
support, as well as the links between budget support and ownership, conditionality and results 
orientation, and finally the predictability of aid, which is an aspect of mutual accountability. 
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Harmonization and alignment 
 
Most programme aid is provided by multilateral donors. They sometimes coordinate with 
other donors. The World Bank’s budget support instrument for low income countries in this 
period was the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC). This is general budget support with 
conditions for almost all sectors of public policy. PRSCs are offered to countries with an on-
track agreement with the IMF and an approved Poverty Reduction Strategy. In Bolivia, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, the financing and/or the policy dialogue for PRSCs have been 
coordinated with at least one other donor: KfW (Germany) co-financed in all three countries; 
in Honduras, Canada, DfID (UK) and Sweden also participated in the policy dialogue. The 
second PRSC in Nicaragua (2006) formed part of the Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA), the 
coordinated system of budget support.  
 
The IDB provided several credits in the form of sector budget support for the three countries. 
Each agreement was negotiated separately with the governments, and no other donors were 
involved. Since 2004, the European Commission (EC) also entered the scene with sector 
budget support. In Nicaragua the EC participates in the JFA, but specific conditions are 
maintained for its sector programmes (one in education, another supports the National 
Development Plan in the social sectors). In Honduras and Bolivia, the EC sector support 
programmes are single donor operations. 
 
Bilateral donors have taken initiatives for wider harmonization of general budget support in 
all three countries. In 2004 in Bolivia and in 2005 in Nicaragua, a group of donors agreed on a 
joint scheme for general budget support. The agreements were signed by seven and nine 
donors respectively. The donors agreed on some fundamental principles that the government 
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needed to abide by in order to receive general budget support, and on a Performance 
Assessment Matrix (PAM) with actions and targets the government would have to meet in 
various years in order to continue to receive support. In Bolivia, the Multi-donor Programme 
for Budget Support did not last long. In Nicaragua, the JFA was still in operation in 2008. In 
Honduras, a Budget Support Group was established in 2006 in which Sweden, Germany, and 
the three multilateral donors (World Bank, IDB and EC) participate, while Spain joined later 
as well. The group aims to harmonize conditions for budget support, but by early 2009, it has 
not been able to establish a joint system.4 
  
Even with joint financing agreements, budget support was not completely harmonized. First, 
some donors did not sign the joint agreement and maintained their own budget support 
programmes, for example the World Bank in Bolivia and the IDB in Nicaragua, at least until 
2007. Second, even donors who did sign the agreement sometimes maintained their own 
procedures, conditions or targets to be met. This holds for the EC in both countries, and for 
the IDB in Bolivia. And third, bilateral agreements generally take legal precedence over the 
joint agreements. This may imply that donors assign different levels of priority to the entry 
conditions (the fundamental principles of the JFA) or to the actions and goals of the PAM, 
and thus make different assessments of performance. 
 
All in all, it is clear that multiple (sector) budget support systems exist, and even with joint 
systems, donor harmonization is far from complete. Moreover, not all sector budget support 
programmes are fully aligned with national systems. The IDB fiscal sector programme in 
Bolivia was managed from a separate implementation unit and used a special account. For the 
EC decentralization programme in Honduras, the government itself set up a separate 
management unit. 
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 Conditionality, ownership, and results orientation 
 
In order to asses the extent of ownership and leadership of the recipient government in budget 
support arrangements, it is necessary to assess the conditions attached to the budget support:  
entry conditions, on the basis of which donors decide whether to engage in budget support 
(the “selectivity”), and conditions arising from the policy dialogue with the recipient 
government and leading to agreement on policies to be executed and targets (results) to be 
met. Within the latter category, a distinction can be made between “hard” and “soft” 
conditions. A hard condition -- a “trigger” in the terminology of the World Bank or 
“performance condition” for the “variable tranch” of the EC programmes (see Adam et al., 
2004) -- must be met before (partial) disbursement takes place. 
 
The entry conditions or selection criteria for most donors included (i) macro-economic 
stability-- usually operationalized as a current IMF agreement --;(ii) a PRSP or similar 
development strategy; (iii) minimum guarantees with respect to government financial 
management; and , (iv) overall trust in the government and governance (Vos and Cabezas, 
2004). For providing balance of payments support, an IMF agreement and some overall trust 
in the government were usually sufficient, thus the new aid paradigm seems to have raised the 
bar for obtaining budget support.  
 
In practice, an IMF programme and some trust in government and governance continued to be 
the most important entry conditions, while the other two conditions proved to be less critical. 
Bolivia did not receive budget support between 2001 and 2003 for lack of an IMF agreement, 
and the same applies to Honduras for the periods 2002-2004 and after 2006. In Nicaragua 
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there was little programme aid between 1999-2003 because donors did not trust the Alemán 
government, while much more confidence in the Bolaños government plus continued IMF 
agreements since November 2003 provided the basis for budget support from 2004 onwards. 
On the other hand, the lack of an approved PRSP in Bolivia was no obstacle for programme 
aid in 2003 or for setting up the mult-donor budget support programme in 2004. Financial 
management was not perfect in any of the countries, but as long as plans for improvement 
were made, donors were willing to take the risk. 
 
The second type of conditions -- conditions following from the policy dialogue and reflected 
in Performance Assessment Matrices (PAMs) -- present a danger of reducing national 
ownership if the conditions are not consistent with national priorities or leave governments 
little flexibility in how to achieve common objectives. It can be expected that there is more 
ownership when i) the number of measures, targets and indicators is lower and if they apply to 
fewer sectors; ii) the conditions follow from nationally-owned PRSPs or plans; and, iii) the 
conditions are more formulated in terms of results to be achieved rather than in terms of 
specific policies or measures to be implemented. This last aspect not only determines how 
much freedom is left to recipient governments to define their own policies, but is also an 
indicator of the extent of the results orientation of budget support. 
 
A review of conditions attached to budget support provided before and after 2000 indicates 
that there has been an increase in the number of policies and sectors in which donors attempt 
to interfere (Dijkstra and Komives, 2008). Judging from the PRSCs in Honduras and 
Nicaragua, conditionality remains strong in the macroeconomic area, in infrastructure and in 
the financial sector, but also has become extensive in the social sectors, in water, in 
environmental policies and in the area of governance, in particular in public finance 
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management. The same wide diversity holds true for the PAM of the Nicaraguan JFA. The 
PAM of the Bolivian multi-donor budget support programme was a positive exception: it only 
contained 23 actions and targets; 18 of these were related to public financial management.  
 
Donors usually maintain that they deduce the policies and indicators for the PAMs from the 
PRSP; if there was no approved new strategy, they used the original PRSP. This approach is 
problematic given the limited domestic ownership of the original strategies. There were also 
practical problems in defining policy conditions on the basis of the national strategies. The 
strategies were not sufficiently operational to include in a PAM, so in practice donors usually 
came up with proposed sets of activities and indicators and negotiated them with the relevant 
government sectors. In this respect, not much has changed in comparison with the old 
structural adjustment conditionality. The Bolivian PAM was again an exception: the18 
indicators and policies regarding financial management were in line with the Ministry of 
Finance’s own strategic framework for the improvement of financial management. This high 
ownership led indeed to a high degree of compliance, during the short life of the agreement. 
 
With respect to results orientation of the PAMs, it is clear that the number of results based 
indicators has increased with the appearance of budget support. The matrices in the joint 
financing agreements, but also the PRSCs, the IDB development policy loans, and the 
programmes of the European Commission all contain some qualitative and quantitative 
targets. However, there are still a great number of process indicators, which define specific 
measures and policies to be executed. The donors still attempt to influence the institutional 
structure and policy measures of the recipient country.  
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Compared to the situation before 2000, conditions have also become “harder”. The lack of an 
approved PRSP was not a barrier for starting the multi-donor budget support programme in 
Bolivia, yet producing an approved strategy was part of the PAM, and non-compliance with 
this particular requirement hampered disbursement by some donors, even though the majority 
of the other conditions had been met. The World Bank and the IDB use an increasing number 
of “pre-conditions” (conditions to be met before the first disbursement) and “triggers” (to be 
met before disbursement of a second tranch). The IDB introduced, next to the policy based 
loans, a “performance based loan” with disbursement on the basis of results. In the EC sector 
programmes, disbursement of the variable tranch can be reduced to zero or to 50 per cent 
depending on the degree of achievement of the defined (quantitative and qualitative) targets 
for the sector. All this means tougher conditionality, or higher chances of non-disbursement or 
partial disbursement of the committed money.  
 
It can be concluded that selectivity does not seem to have increased, nor has national 
ownership of the policies to be implemented or of the targets and indicators to be achieved 
with budget support. Together these two trends mean that chances of conditions being 
implemented with budget support are not higher than with the previous forms of programme 
aid: cosmetic implementation, partial implementation, or delays are still likely. Moreover, as 
conditionality is now more often linked to disbursement, there is likely to be more variability 
in aid flows.  
 
The predictability of budget support  
 
For budget support, predictability of aid flows is even more important than for project aid 
since the resources are part of the general revenues that may also be used for current 
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expenditure. Governments can only plan to spend budget support revenues if the flow of 
money is reliable.  
 
Predictability has been a problem in all three countries. In Bolivia, many budget support 
donors reduced or suspended their committed budget support in 2005. IDB stopped support 
because some specific conditions had not been met. Bilateral donors had a variety of reasons 
for not disbursing, one of them being the lack of a new PRSP, but there were political factors 
as well. Since Bolivia received more tax revenues than expected in 2005, the budget support 
reductions did not affect fiscal stability.  
 
In Nicaragua there was a predictability problem between May and November 2005. All nine 
donors participating in the JFA (signed in May 2005) suspended their disbursements due to a 
problem in the IMF programme (Guimarães et al., 2005). In 2006, disbursements in 
Nicaragua were in line with the agreed schedule. The change in government in early 2007 led 
to some delays in disbursements. In 2008, donors became increasingly concerned about the 
lack of government commitment with the “fundamental principles” of the arrangement, 
especially after the allegedly fraudulent municipal elections of November. This led to delays 
and ultimately to suspensions, so that predictability was seriously compromised.  
 
In Honduras, there have also been problems with disbursement of the limited amount of 
resources entering the country as budget support. The World Bank, for example, did not 
disburse the second tranch of its PRSC in 2005 because the Assembly did not approve the 
new Civil Service Law, which was one of the “triggers”. This Law would potentially have 
helped end clientelism in Honduran civil service. Regardless, the non disbursement affected 
the expected inflows in 2005.  
 22
 5. The Paris Agenda and SWAps and common funds 
 
We next look at the implementation of the principles of the Paris Declaration in three specific 
cases of SWAps or common funds, one each from Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia. All 
three cases involve coordinated support by multiple donors for a sector-wide or sub-sector 
plan or strategy and are therefore considered programme based approaches. Of the three, 
Nicaragua’s sector-wide programme in rural development -- PRORURAL -- most closely 
approximates a true SWAp. It is organized around a plan for the rural productive sector and 
encompasses many projects (many of which predate the plan) and a common fund. Honduras’ 
Education for All is a sub-sector programme in primary education, which is also supported by 
a combination of projects and a common fund.  The “education basket” in Bolivia is a 
common fund originally created in 2004 to support a Multi-Annual Operational Plan (POMA) 
for the education sector. 
 
Ownership and leadership 
 
In order to consider to what extent the three programmes represent progress towards 
achieving national ownership and leadership of the aid process, we first examine the plans 
that provided the initiative for each agreement. On this point, the three examples are quite 
different.  In Bolivia, the impulse for starting an education basket was to support the 
Education Ministry’s own multi-annual operational plan (POMA). PRORURAL is also built 
around a sector plan that was developed over time by the institutions involved in the rural 
development sector in Nicaragua and through numerous consultative processes (see Kay 
article in this issue).  However, the content of the programme (e.g. the projects and activities 
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funded through PRORURAL) includes many projects that were largely donor-driven 
initiatives. The EFA programme in Honduras was a joint government and donor initiative, but 
its content is mainly determined by donors. The objectives, teaching measures, proposals for 
institutional reforms, and textbooks in the EFA programme were all created and designed by 
donors like USAID, World Bank, and Japan. 
 
PRSPs or national development plans were not the basis of the sector and sub-sector plans in 
any of the three cases. PRORURAL was developed in parallel to Nicaragua’s second PRSP, 
and by a different group within the government, which led to some contradictions between the 
two plans.. This experience is not unique to PRORURAL or to Nicaragua: PRSPs tend to be 
developed under the leadership of the Ministry of Finance or the Presidency, whereas the 
development of sector plans is usually under the auspices of sector ministries. This could 
potentially mean that sector-based plans enjoy more ownership among the officials charged 
with implementing them. However, even if this is the case, these three cases demonstrate that 
it is hard to maintain government leadership and ownership over the life of the sector plans, 
and particularly after a change in government.  
 
In Bolivia, the Morales government quickly rejected the Education POMA created under 
President Mesa. In the interest of keeping the education basket running, the donors decided to 
be flexible and support any new government initiative that had the same general goals as the 
rejected POMA. This led to donors approving requests for particular expenditures from the 
basket, without an official guiding plan. In Nicaragua, the change of government did not lead 
to a rejection of PRORURAL, but the Ortega government is going outside of the 
PRORURAL donor framework to find support for its key rural development programmes. 
The major supporter of the government’s flagship programme Zero Hunger, for example, is 
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Venezuela, a country that is not a party to PRORURAL. There may still be ownership of 
PRORURAL, but the government’s key priorities lie elsewhere. In Honduras, donors had to 
remind the Zelaya government (2006) of the existence of the EFA programme (De Jong et al., 
2008). Donor disbursements and implementation stagnated until the government eventually 
gave its general support to continuation of the programme. 
 
Results orientation and mutual accountability 
 
Donors participating in a common fund or basket within a SWAp usually have some 
additional entry requirements or set some conditions for disbursement. In these three cases, 
the disbursement conditions are focused on administration and financial management, not on 
content or development results. Programme targets are not always clear, and meeting 
objectives is never a condition of disbursement. For participation in PRORURAL, donors just 
ascertained whether the government of Nicaragua had the necessary capacity to implement a 
SWAp. This was measured, among other things, by the existence of a sectoral planning 
process, of monitoring mechanisms, of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework, and of a 
sector policy or programme with appropriate targets. For disbursements from the common 
fund, fiduciary controls were defined. PRORURAL does have monitoring indicators that were 
developed jointly between the government and donors, but there is no explicit consequence 
for failure to meet targets. In Bolivia’s education basket, conditions relate to reporting, 
accounting, and expenditure. Initially the agreement was also going to have a set of indicators, 
but the development of these indicators stopped with the change in government and rejection 
of the POMA. All in all, the policy dialogue around these programmes is not much focused on 
results and does not show signs of strong mutual accountability. 
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Harmonization and alignment 
 
With respect to donor harmonization, PRORURAL represents a significant step forward. The 
government and all involved donors signed a Code of Conduct and developed an Ownership, 
Harmonization and Alignment Plan for Aid to the Rural Productive Sector (2005-2007). 
There are joint missions, a common set of monitoring indicators, and only one report is 
produced for all donors. Yet, most donors participate in PRORURAL through their projects, 
many of which already existed before PRORURAL started, and all these projects have their 
own specific procedures. There is a donor-government roundtable for the rural productive 
sector, and the wide coordination around PRORURAL keeps donors informed about what 
others are doing. Nonetheless, two important sector donors remain outside this agreement 
altogether —the Millennium Challenge Corporation and Venezuela. 
  
The eleven donors in Honduras’ Education for All programme also signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding and participate in a roundtable for the education sector. Six donors contribute 
to the common fund (Sweden, KfW, Canada, Spain, the EC, and, to a limited extent, the 
World Bank). The fund establishes the common conditions for disbursement. However, the 
procedures are based on a format that the World Bank uses for projects and these procedures 
are not always consistent with national standards and systems (Salomonsson and Sjölander, 
2005). 
 
Bolivia’s education basket, in contrast, adopted local accounting and financial procedures.   
Donor coordination, however, is limited. It started with only three donors and now has four. 
At various points in the past there has been a functioning education roundtable for wider 
sector coordination, but many of the current government’s key priorities for the sector (such 
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as a new alphabetization campaign) are financed by Venezuela and Cuba, who do not 
participate in these discussions. 
 
Administrative and financial practices are in some ways reminiscent of projects with little 
evidence of alignment. In the Bolivian education basket and in EFA’s common fund, there is 
more attention to using national systems than was the case with projects, but donors are still 
asked to approve specific expenditures. Nicaragua’s PRORURAL had 38 different sources of 
financing in 2006, many still with different procedures.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The new aid paradigm that was adopted around the year 2000 assumes that nationally owned, 
results oriented, long-term plans would form the basis for aid alignment and harmonization 
under the leadership of governments, and help create new partnerships between donors and 
recipients. The 2005 Paris Declaration confirmed the central role of plans in fostering 
ownership and leadership of the aid process, and also confirmed the international commitment 
to the principles of alignment, harmonization, results orientation and mutual accountability. 
This paper assessed to what extent Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua are implementing the 
principles of the Paris Declaration and what the role of the PRSPs or other national or sector 
plans has been. 
 
Overall progress on the Paris Agenda is limited. Programme aid does not exceed one-fifth of 
total aid and has even decreased as compared with the late 1990s. Project aid is still the 
dominant aid modality. Although some donors give sector budget support and there are also 
some attempts at SWAps, the three countries will not come close to meeting the Paris 
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Declaration objective of providing two-thirds of aid in the form of programme based 
approaches by 2010. And even programme based approaches show limited progress toward 
ownership, alignment, and harmonization. 
 
These disappointing results in three countries give rise to questions about the effectiveness of 
national or sector development plans as basis for achieving the Paris Agenda. To what extent 
can the lack of progress be explained by the presence or absence of PRSPs?  
 
Although all donors said that their aid projects are in line with the PRSPs or similar national 
development plans, it is clear upon closer inspection that these plans hardly played a role in 
promoting aid coordination under government leadership. In fact, the original PRSPs 
contained more or less all existing donor projects and programmes, and there was limited 
domestic ownership. New governments rejected or ignored the plans elaborated by their 
predecessors. This suggests that it was unrealistic to think countries were able to create and 
maintain a broadly shared, long-term consensus on a strategy to reduce poverty.  It was also 
unrealistic to expect strategic plans to provide operational guidance for aid efforts or 
convincing evidence of government commitment to reduce poverty. 
  
Second, PRSPs and other national plans proved to be hardly relevant for the decision to 
provide general budget support. An approved PRSP was not necessary for the Bolivian multi-
donor budget support programme to be established, and it was not sufficient for a joint budget 
support scheme to appear in Honduras. Apart from this, the composition of the donor group 
mattered for the volume of budget support. There is much less general budget support in 
Honduras due to absence of the UK, the Netherlands, and most Nordic donors (except 
Sweden)5. On paper, the new aid paradigm would bring about more selectivity in the decision 
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to provide programme aid (budget support). This would reduce the need for conditions during 
the process and would thus facilitate domestic ownership. But in practice, having a PRSP and 
financial management criteria hardly played a role in this decision;  the main criteria for 
determining whether or not to provide budget support continued to be whether there was an 
IMF agreement in place (for macroeconomic stability) and some trust in governance. Yet, 
although entry conditions did not become tougher, the share of programme aid decreased 
rather than increased after 2000, under the changed aid paradigm. This can be explained by 
the fact that donors sometimes compensated a lack of selectivity ex ante (in the decision to 
engage in budget support at all) with more extensive and tougher conditionality within the 
programmes. This reduced the actual flows as well as the predictability of budget support, and 
thus affected the principle of mutual accountability.  
 
Third, the experiences with the SWAps and common funds examined in this paper show that 
these programme based approaches do not have much relation with the PRSPs either. In 
practice, SWAps were based on sector plans, but these were sometimes formulated with great 
influence of the donors. And even when there was ownership by one government, subsequent 
administrations rarely embraced the plans and sector support schemes of previous 
governments. Existing SWAps retain characteristics of projects in many cases -- with 
independent execution units and many different procedures required by the involved donors.  
 
The overall experience reflects the real and largely underestimated difficulties in advancing 
towards the implementation of the Paris agenda. The path has not been made any easier in 
Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua by the frequent, contested changes of government and 
period of political instability. Fundamentally, however, the basis for the new aid paradigm -- a 
broadly shared and operational strategy that would act as proof of commitment to reduce 
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poverty -- proved unrealistic. As a result, individual priorities, procedures and systems 
remained dominant, both among donors and among (and within) recipient governments. 
 
 
Endnotes 
1. Programme aid is aid that is not tied to specific projects, but is usually accompanied by 
policy conditions (OECD, 1991). 
2.  General and sector budget support are forms of programme aid and are thus not earmarked. 
In the case of sector budget support, the policy dialogue focuses on one sector in particular, 
while with general budget support the policy dialogue may focus on any aspect of public 
policies and governance. In sector wide approaches (SWAps), donors work together to 
support a sector or sometimes sub-sector. This usually includes common funds or baskets in 
which donors pool their funds, but donors may also support separate projects as long as they 
are in line with the country’s sector strategy. 
3.  In 1999, Bolivia became a pilot country for the Comprehensive Development Framework 
of the World Bank, the forerunner of the PRSP approach, also emphasizing government 
ownership and leadership of the aid process. 
4. The lack of an ongoing IMF programme since 2006 hinders the provision of any 
programme aid in this country. 
5. Sweden decided in 2007 to gradually move out of both Honduras and Nicaragua. 
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 Table 1. Programme aid and total aid, annual averages, in US$ millions and in per cent, 1995-
2000 and 2001-2006 
 1995-2000 2001-2006 
 Programme aid Total aid In % Programme aid Total aid in %
Bolivia 754 3637 21 800 4137 19
Honduras 367 1606 23 210 1628 13
Nicaragua 680 3107 22 443 3291 13
 
Notes: In Bolivia, figures include loans from the Andean Finance Corporation, which are formally not 
part of aid because they are not concessional. In Honduras, figures only include aid loans, not grants, 
which probably implies a slight underestimation of programme aid for the second period. 
Sources: VIPFE in Bolivia, BCN in Nicaragua, Ministry of Finance Honduras. 
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